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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WELBY AAGARD, 
Plaint~!! and A.p,pellant, 
-vs.-
DAYTON & MILLER RED-E-MIX 
CONCRETE COMPANY, and 
THOMAS CHARLES COOK, 
Defendants a;nd Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
9373 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Throughout this Brief, Plaintiff and Appellant will be 
referred to as plaintiff. Defendants will be referred to as 
defendants, or by their individual names, as the case may 
be. All italics are ours. 
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STATEMENT OF FACT'S 
This is an appeal from a Judgment entered on the 
24th of October, 1960, of No Cause of Action. 
This action arises out of a collision between two 
trucks which occurred on the 3rd day of November, 1958, 
at approximately 1 :30 P.M. on U.S. Highway 30, six miles 
east of Morgan, Utah. 
Plaintiff's truck at the time of the collision was 
driven by his employee, J. Clifford Bloomquist, Dayton 
& Miller Red-E-Mix Concrete Company truck was being 
driven by the other defendant, Thomas Charles Cook. 
The collision occurred near the underpass where 
U.S. Highway 30 crosses under the Union Pacific Rail-
road. The point of impact on the truck of plaintiff was 
along the left side. The point of impact on the truck of 
defendant, Dayton & Miller Red-E-Mix Concrete Com-
pany, was on the left side of the concrete truck. Plain-
tiff's truck was extensively damaged and a number of 
sheep which it was carrying destroyed. 
The case was tried before the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist on the 28th of September, 1960, and after trial 
the Court made the following Finding of Fact: 
"That the evidence is evenly balanced as to 
which of the parties was negligent." 
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From this Finding of Fact, the Court concluded 
that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. 
The facts, plaintiff maintains, could only have been 
found as he contends. There is no credible evidence to 
the contrary of his contention. His position is that the 
Court arbitrarily and capriciously has refused to give 
effect to the undisputed, uncontroverted evidence. 
Three witnesses testified concerning the scene of the 
collision and the circumstances surrounding the way that 
plaintiff's truck and the truck belonging to Dayton & 
Miller Red-E-Mix Concrete Company came together. 
The driver of the plaintiff's truck was a man 66 years 
old. He had been hauling lambs up and down the road 
on which the collision occurred for several days prior 
to the collision. (R. 3). His truck was in good shape, the 
brakes and body free of mechanical difficulties of any 
kind. (R. 4) He came down the road going west as he en-
tered the underpass and was travelling between 15 and 
20 miles per hour. (R. 5). The truck was loaded with 100 
head of lambs. As he came out from under the underpass 
he saw the truck being driven by Cook. His description 
on direct examination was as follows: (R. 6) 
"Q. Now, as you approached the underpass, tell 
us what happened. 
A. Well, when I approached the underpass why 
I just got through the underpass about two 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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lengths, not hardly two lengths of the truck 
I seen - this here cement truck coming and 
he was coming at a good rate of speed, and 
he was right over there on that curve over 
there. 
Q. What do you mean when you say 'over there'~ 
A. About where you can see. I could see he was 
on the wrong side of the road when he came 
there he pulled back. He was coming back 
all right. He was getting back over there all 
right when he sideswiped me." 
Plaintiff's truck was knocked over into the barrow 
pit and came into contact with the side of the road after 
the collision. (R. 7 and 8). 
On cross-examination 1fr. Bloomquist stated con-
cerning what he observed, as follows: (R. 28) 
"Q. Now, you testified I think on direct examina-
tion that you were traveling on your own 
side of the road~ 
A. Yes, sir ............ . 
Q. And as I recall you said this cement truck 
came around the curve and he was on your 
side of the road coming right toward youT 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And how far was he on your side of the road~ 
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A. Well, I can't tell you just exactly how far he 
was. 
Q. I realize sir, you didn't measure it. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And we don't expect to hold you to that type 
of an estimate, can you give us in your best 
estimate how far you claim this truck was 
over on your side of the road. 
A. Well, when I first seen him I figured that 
his right front wheel was coming up, was 
right on the yellow line. 
Q. His right front wheels~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then what you're saying, sir, is that all of 
his truck was on your side of the road. 
A. All, his truck, the way I got it figured out, 
and the way it looked to me that his right 
front wheel was right on the yellow line be-
tween the two yellow lines. 
Q. He was coming toward you 1 
A. Yes, sir; on a curve. You see that curve there 
you can see the way he came. 
Q. Now you are referring to, your point of 
reference I take it then is the painted line 
on the road that you told us was there at 
the time1 
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A. Yes, sir. I am positive it was, I wouldn't 
swear to it, but I think it was. I know it is 
there now. It is dim. 
Q. Mr. Bloomquist, do you remember at the time 
I took your deposition we discussed how far 
this truck was over the line or what you first 
saw as to where this truck was and do you 
remember telling me that you thought he was 
over about 3 or 4 feet and you determined 
that by the yellow line~ 
A. Yes, well that would put him over 3 or 4 feet 
if he was on the yellow line. 
Q. Do you remember making this statement to 
me in answer to my question, was there any 
line or mark on the pavement 1 
A. Yes, Sir. 
Q. Could you see it 1 
A_. Well, I could see it when I got around the 
bend, I didn't see it when he hit me, of course 
I could see ,just, just see him coming and I 
could see that he wasn't going to miss me, 
I could see that.'' 
The driver of the truck of defendants was Thomas 
Charles Cook. He was a boy of 18 years at the time the 
impact occurred, licensed to drive, but without a chauf-
fer's license. He had limited experience in the handling 
of the concrete tn1ck. Concerning what Cook observed, 
he testified on direct examination as follows: (R.108) 
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"Q. Did he appear to be on his side of the Road~ 
A. He was when he was coming around the cor-
ner, he was on his side. 
Q. All right, go ahead. 
A. As he passed me it looked like he was very 
close and it sounded like somebody running 
down the picket fence with a stick. 
Q. Did you feel anything~ 
A. No." 
On cross examination Cook stated as follows, con-
cerning the position of plaintiff. (R. 116) 
"Q. You never did then, Mr. Cook, see Mr. Bloom-
quist's truck other than on its own side of the 
road¥ 
A. I don't think so. No, I never." 
Officer Mason Hill testified concerning the condition 
of the road. He discovered that there was no evidence 
on the surface of the highway to show the point of im-
pact but he did discover that about 60 steps to the west 
of the underpass there was evidence of the plaintiff's 
truck leaving the black top. At approximately 70 steps 
from the underpass there was evidence of the plaintiff's 
truck having come into i1npact with the enbankment on 
the north side of the highway. (R. 55). 
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A dispute developed between Bloomquist and Cook 
concerning the exact place in relationship to the under-
pass that the impact occurred. The evidence quoted 
seems clearly to show that there was no evidence that 
Bloomquist ever permitted his truck to be on the half 
of the road reserved for eastbound traffic. 
Plaintiff's truck was brought to a stop about 70 
feet beyond the west side of the underpass. After Bloom-
quist discovered that the sheep on the truck were dying 
and smothering, he moved the truck 2/lOths of a mile 
further down the road where he stopped and permitted 
the sheep to leave the truck. He thus attempted to pre-
vent any more of them from dying than had already been 
killed. 
Cook testified that after he came into impact with 
the plaintiff's truck, he drove up the highway a short 
distance, walked back to the underpass and then rode 
on a pickup truck back up to his own truck and proceeded 
on up the canyon. He testified that when he came back 
down the canyon after unloading his cement he saw the 
truck of plaintiff at the side of the road but did not stop. 
He never made any report of the collision between the 
two vehicles. 
Plaintiff's driver, Blomnquist, reported the collision 
to the State Highway Patrolman and an investigation 
revealed that the truck driven by Cook was the one which 
came into ilnpact with plaintiff's truck. 
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It is plaintiff's position that the evidence shows 
conclusively, without dispute, that the impact occurred 
on the half of the highway reserved for westbound traffic 
and that the impact could not have occurred without the 
negligence of the defendant, Thomas Cook, being the 
causative factor. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ARBITRARILY DISREGARDED 
THE UNCONTRADICTED, CREDIBLE AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT, THOMAS CHARLES COOK, ADMITTED 
THAT THE TRUCK OF PLAINTIFF WAS NEVER ON HIS 
SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY. 
ARGU~iENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ARBITRARILY DISREGARDED 
THE UNCONTRADICTED, CREDIBLE AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE. 
The witness, Bloomquist, testified clearly, unequi-
vocally and consistently concerning one basic fact which 
it is submitted is conclusive. This was the fact that the 
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Dayton & Miller Red-E-l\1ix truck was over the center 
line of the highway. That the driver of the Dayton truck 
was getting back across the line of the highway at the 
moment the impact between the sides of the two trucks 
occurred. There is no other logical, reasonable, or sens-
ible explanation of how the two vehicles came into im-
pact. 
Defendant Cook had no explanation of the impact. 
He testified clearly and consistently that at no time had 
he ever seen the truck of plaintiff on his side of the high-
way. He further testified that he did not believe that 
there ever was going to be any impact between his truck 
and the truck of plaintiff. He likewise testified that he 
remained on his own side of the highway. It is obvious 
that the testimony of defendant, Cook, could not he accur-
ate since if the truck of plaintiff remained on his side 
of the highway, and the truck of the defendants remained 
on their side of the highway, there would have been 
no collision. When asked on cross examination to explain 
this inconsistency, the defendant Cook was unable to 
offer any explanation. 
There was a basic dispute developed between Cook 
and the testimony of Bloomquist as corroborated by 
Hill, the Highway Patrolman, concerning the point of 
impact. Cook testified that the impact occurred on the 
east side of the underpass. Bloomquist testified that it 
occurred on the West of the underpass. Hill discovered 
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the tracks of plaintiff's truck on the west side of the 
underpass leaving the highway and also the evidence of 
impact between the right side of plaintiff's truck and 
the hill side which was west of the underpass. 
This inconsistency and disagreement between the 
testimony of Bloomquist and Cook is not material to any 
issue on the question of negligence. As far as plaintiff 
is able to discover, it would make no difference whether 
the impact occurred on the east side of the underpass or 
the west side of the underpass. The crucial question is 
whether or not the truck of plaintiff was on its own side 
of the highway or infringed upon the portion reserved 
for eastbound travel. 
It is respectfully submitted that there is no disagree-
ment between the witnesses concerning where the vehicle 
of plaintiff was at all times. It was on its own side of 
the highway. The dispute arises as to where the defend-
ant's vehicle was. As to this fact the evidence is contra-
dictory. 
Having established without dispute the position of 
the plaintiff's vehicle, it is respectfully submitted that 
the only way that collision could occur was if the defend-
ant's vehicle invaded the half of the highway reserved 
for westbound traffic. 
It appears to plaintiff that there could be no ques-
tion that under the circumstances shown by the photo-
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graphs and the plat of the highway where there are two 
large heavy trucks approaching an underpass, where 
visibility through the underpass is obstructed and the 
clearance is impaired, that anyone who drove, or per-
mitted his vehicle to invade the half of its highway re-
served for traffic moving in the opposite direction would 
be negligent in the absence of some emergency or other 
satisfactory explanation, as matter of law. 
Bloomquist had no interest in the outcome of the 
trial and was not in any way monetarily concerned in 
who should prevail. True, he was an employe, at the time 
of the collision, for the purpose of driving truck of the 
plaintiff, but as far as the record indicates was not so 
employed at the time of the trial, and as a consequence, 
it is submitted, that his interest was not such as would 
classify him as a partisan or interested witness. 
A very impressive case, concerning the testimony 
of an employe in litigation concerning his employer, is 
Esso Standard Oil Company v. Stewart, 190 Va. 949, 59 
SE 2d 67, 18 ALR 2d. 1319. In this case, employees of de-
fendant testified concerning the adjustments and repairs 
made on an oil furnace. The critical question concerned 
the condition of the oil furnace at the time of their 
inspection and repair. There was no contradictory evi-
dence to the testimony of the employees. The Jury ren-
dered judg1nent in favor of the plaintiff for damage 
resulting to his house when the oil furnace created smoke 
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which invaded the premises. The Virginia Court held as 
follows: 
• 'Neither the Jury nor we are entitled to dis-
regard the uncontradicted and not inherently in-
credible testimony. 
"In Epperson v. De Jarnette, 164 Va. 482, 
180 S.E. 412, we find : 
" 'While the Jury is the Judge of the weight 
of testimony, and the credibility of witnesses, it 
cannot arbitrarily disregard the uncontradicted 
evidence of unimpeached witnesses which is not 
inherently incredible and not inconsistent with 
other facts and circumstances appearing in the 
record, even though such witnesses are interested 
in the result of the litigation.' " 
This Court, in an original proceedings, arising out 
of an Industrial Commission case has cited the rule 
in different language but substantially the same as the 
Virginia Court. In Jones, et al. v. California Packing 
Corporation et al., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640. This 
Court, after review of evidence, stated the general rule 
as follows: 
(P. 619). "No issue is taken with the thought 
that the Commission is not obliged to believe evi-
dence if there is anything inherently incredible 
about it, or any circumstance to warrant failure 
to accept it. However, where facts are proved by 
uncontradicted testimony of competent disinter-
ested witnesses and there is nothing inherently 
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unreasonable, nor any circumstance which would 
tend to raise doubt of its truth, it should be taken 
as established. Refusal to do so is an arbitrary 
disregard by the trier of the facts, 20 Am. Jr. 
1030, Evidence, Sec. 1180; 32 C.J .S., Evidence, 
Section 1038, page 1089, Evidence, Sec. 1038. For 
a somewhat comprehensive survey of the problem 
of when the trier of the fact may disregard un-
contradicted testimony, see annotation 8 A.L.R. 
796; see also Jensen v. Logan City, 96 Utah 522, 
88 P.2d 459, and Gagos v. Industrial Comm., 87 
Utah 101, 48 P. 2d 449." 
At a later point in the opinion, the Court made the 
following additional statement concerning the disregard 
of substantial uncontradicted evidence: 
"There is substantial, competent evidence 
which points so unerringly to the conclusion that 
the injury did result from the employment that we 
are persuaded that the Commission acted un-
reasonably and arbitrarily in refusing to believe 
it. There is no evidence of any substance to the 
contrary." 
It is respectfully submitted that a finding which dis~ 
regards uncontradicted, credible and reasonable testi-
mony is arbitrary. That a finder of facts is as capricious 
when he makes no finding in disregard of such evidence 
as where he finds facts to the contrary. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court in 
failing to find that the defendants were negligent, arbi-
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trarily and capriciously disregarded competent uncontra-
dicted, credible evidence. This Court should reverse the 
Trial Court and grant plaintiff a new trial, or order 
Judgment entered in his favor. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT, THOMAS CHARLES COOK, ADMITTED 
THAT THE TRUCK OF PLAINTIFF WAS NEVER ON HIS 
SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY. 
A slightly different rule applies to the testimony 
of a party to an action from the rule applicable where 
testimony is given by a disinterested or uninvolved wit-
ness. 
This Court has on several occasions announced the 
rule that a party is bound by the testimony which he 
gives. This is so even thought it is of such a nature as 
to completely destroy the possibility of his recovery. The 
first announcement of this rule by the Utah Supreme 
Court was in the case of Fowler v. Pleasant Valley Coal 
Company, 16 Utah 348, 52 Pac. 594. There, the plaintiff 
sued for damages resulting from personal injury and 
testified in his own behalf concerning certain facts relat-
ing to a dangerous overhanging coal slab in the mine 
in which he was working. This Court stated the rule as 
follows: (Pac. pg. 596) 
"If there is a contradiction, it arises from 
plaintiff's own testimony. In such case, where 
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non-suit is asked, the trial court may consider 
such testimony true as bears most strongly 
against the interest of the plaintiff." 
This Court applied the general rule again in the 
case of Benson v. Denver & Rio Gr.avnde W e.stern Rail-
road Company, 4 U. 2d 38, 286 P. 2d 790. This case in-
volved the testimony of a driver concerning the distance 
he could see ahead and the speed at which he was driving. 
The Court upholding the granting of a nonsuit, cited 
the early case of Fowler v. Pleasant Valley Coal Com-
pany, supra, and quoted with approval the case of 
Wheeler v. Fidel~ty & Deposit Company of Maryland, 
63 F. 2d 562, as follows: (p. 564) : 
"Where, as in this case, the party testifies 
in his own behalf, he is not entitled to go to the 
Jury on an issue unless that portion of his own 
testimony which is least favorable to his conten-
tion is of such a character as will sustain a verdict 
in his favor." 
The Court in the Benson case also cited with ap-
proval Alv.attado v. Tucker, 2 U. 2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986. This 
case involved the testimony of a police officer who was 
produced and testified on behalf of the plaintiff. This 
Court held that where the officer has testified that the 
brake marks indicated the automobile to be going between 
25 and 30 mHes per hour, a finding would be justified that 
the speed was 25 miles per hour. The evidence least 
favorable to the party producing it would be accepted. 
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This interpretation revealed that the defendant was not 
speeding since the speed limit was 25 miles per hour. 
There are a number of annotations concerning this 
rule. One of the early annotations is at 80 ALR 625. 
There, the general rule is recited as follows: (P. 625) 
"A majority of the cases support the rule that 
a party is precluded by his own testimony which 
is favorable to the adverse party." 
The annotation cites cases from a number of juris-
dictions supporting the general rule. Among those are 
the following: United States, Alabama, California, Con-
necticut, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New 
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Wisconsin. 
The Utah case cited is Fowler v. Pleasant Valley 
Coal Company, supra. A more recent Annotation of the 
Rule is at 169 ALR 798. There, the Annotators recite 
the rule in the following language: (P. 799) 
"If a party, in his testimony, makes a ma-
terial statement of fact, negavating his right of 
action or defense, and no more favorable testi-
n1ony appears to contradict or modify, he is hound 
by it regardless of its credibility. Ordinarily, a 
Judge or Jury n1ay disbelieve what a party says 
on the witness stand, even though uncontradicted, 
but under this general rule his opponent is entitled 
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to hold him to it, and even to demand a finding 
acco·rdingly as matter of law.'' 
Again numerous jurisdictions are cited as being in 
favor of the general rule. 
It is respectfully submitted that the testimony of 
Cook, who is a party to the action, to the effect that at no 
time was the truck of plaintiff observed on the wrong 
side of the road, should preclude any speculation or 
finding, that it was on the wrong side of the road. 
The evidence of the plaintiff consistently also shows 
that his truck did remain on its own side of the road. 
The only possible way in which the truck of plaintiff 
and the truck of defendant, could collide is if the truck 
of defendants invaded the side of the highway reserved 
for use by westbound traffic. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court acted 
arbitrarily, capriciously and contrary to law in ruling 
that the evidence was evenly balanced, and plaintiff was 
not entitled to recover. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should 
reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court and order that 
the Court detern1ine that the defendants were negligent; 
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that plaintiff was entitled to judgment and order a new 
trial on the issue of damages only, or in the alternative 
grant plaintiff a new trial. 
DATED this ________________ day of--------------------------------, 1961. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KING AND HUGHES 
DWIGHT L. KING 
2121 South State Street 
No. 205 Sentinel Building 
Salt Lake·City, Utah 
Attorneys fO'r Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
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